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Non-technical Summary
The importance of R&D as a main factor of sustainable growth in highly industrialized
economies is undisputable among economists, especially on the background of the structural
shift from resource-based economies to modern knowledge-based economies. In this line,
countries cannot only rely on public R&D conducted at universities or public research
institutions. The role of R&D performed in the business sector is of increasing importance in
society. In order to stimulate R&D in the business sector, governments usually offer a wide
range of public incentives, like R&D subsidies, tax credits, technological consultancy etc. 
In this paper, we study the relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D activities
empirically. Conducting a treatment effects analysis, we investigate whether public R&D
funding in Belgium crowds-out the private investment in the business sector. We employ the
third wave of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) for Flanders for our analysis and link
the firm level information with other data resources on patents and financial statements.
Our sample covers the Flemish manufacturing sector and computer services, R&D services as
well as business related services. In total, the sample consists of 776 firms, of which 180 refer
to recipients of R&D subsidies. Using a non-parametric nearest-neighbor matching, we find
that firms which received public funding for innovation projects would have invested
significantly less in R&D if they had not received the subsidies. This holds true for both the
full sample and a subsample including only innovating firms. First, we use the full sample that
also includes non-innovative firms in the control group, because there may be subsidized
firms that would not have conducted any R&D if they had not been subsidized. The reasons
can range from too high cost or too high risk of research projects to the inability to raise
sufficient external capital. If the potential control group is restricted to innovating firms only,
one thus might underestimate the treatment effect, because the innovation status of a firm can
change from non-innovative to innovative due to the receipt of a subsidy and vice versa. In
addition to the full sample, however, we also test the hypothesis of crowding out effects in the
subsample of innovating firms only, because some readers might argue that the first result is
driven by the non-innovative firms only. However, the results confirm the previous
estimations. The hypothesis of crowding-out is also rejected in the subsample of innovating
firms. 
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out effects on the input side of the innovation process. Different
specifications of R&D activity are considered as outcome variables in the
treatment effects analysis. Applying a non-parametric matching, we
conclude that subsidized firms would have invested significantly less in
R&D activities, on average, if they had not received public R&D funding.
Thus, crowding-out effects can be rejected in this case.
Keywords: R&D, Subsidies, Policy Evaluation, Non-parametric matching
JEL-Classification: C14, C25, H50, O38
 * Kris Aerts ** Dirk Czarnitzki
Address: K.U. Leuven Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
Steunpunt O&O Statistieken Dep. of Industrial Economics and International Management
Dekenstraat 2 P.O. Box 10 34 43
3000 Leuven D-68034 Mannheim
Belgium Germany
Phone: +32/16/326359 +49/621/1235-158
Fax: +32/16/325799 +49/621/1235-170
E-mail: kris.aerts@econ.kuleuven.ac.be czarnitzki@zew.de
** This paper was written during research stays of Dirk Czarnitzki at K.U. Leuven and UC Berkeley. I thank
both institutions for their hospitality. Moreover, I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Volkswagen
foundation for my visit to the UC Berkeley.
11 Introduction
The importance of R&D as a main factor of sustainable growth in highly industrialized economies is
undisputable among economists, especially on the background of the structural shift from resource-
based economies to modern knowledge-based economies. In this line, countries cannot only rely on
public R&D conducted at universities or public research institutions. The role of R&D performed in
the business sector is of increasing importance in society (cf., for example, European Commission,
2003). In order to stimulate R&D in the business sector, governments usually offer a wide range of
public incentives, like R&D subsidies, tax credits, technological consultancy etc. 
There are clear economic rationales behind supporting private R&D: the level of privately financed
R&D activities is lower than socially desired, because R&D has the characteristics of a public good
and generates positive external effects, which cannot be internalized (see Arrow, 1962). Thus, there
may be projects that would have positive benefits to society, but do not cover the private cost.
Therefore, these projects are not carried out and the quantity of innovations is below the socially
desirable level. This circumstance is the main reason for governments to subsidize private R&D
projects. Public funding reduces the price for private investors and thus more innovation takes place,
ideally reaching the social equilibrium.1
However, the economic dilemma is that a firm always has an incentive to apply for public R&D
support, even if it could perform the R&D projects using its own financial means. If public support is
granted, the firm then might simply substitute public for private investment instead of increasing its
R&D spending. This possible crowding-out effect between public grants and private investment has
been discussed in the economic literature for decades and has to be taken into account when public
authorities decide on the level of their engagement in R&D support programs. 
In this paper, we study the relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D activities empirically.
Conducting a treatment effects analysis, we investigate whether public R&D funding in Flanders
crowds-out the private investment in the business sector. Flanders as part of Belgium is a small region
that is subjective to external competition and thus needs to innovate on a permanent basis to be able to
compete in the global economy. Therefore the Flemish government is highly interested in stimulating
innovation activities in the local business sector. Consequently, it is called for empirical evidence on
the benefits of such public investments. We employ the third wave of the Community Innovation
Survey for Flanders for our analysis and link the firm level information with other data resources on
                                                     
1 Another important argument for a governmental market intervention is financial constraints for research and
development. See Hall (2002) for a survey on this topic.
2patents and financial statements. The following section summarizes the existing literature on related
studies and section 3 outlines our econometric approach. Section 4 presents the data and variables used
in the analysis as well as the estimation results. The fifth section concludes and outlines further
research on this topic.
2 Literature Review
After the US R&D budget was significantly raised during the 1950s, Blank and Stigler (1957) were
among the first to question the relationship between publicly funded and private R&D. With a large
sample of firms they tested whether a complementary or substitutive relationship between public and
private R&D investment existed. In case of a complementary relationship, firms use to extent their
innovation activities due to public funding. If full crowding-out effects between public and private
funds occur, the private innovation activities remain constant. The implications of such studies are
significant for today’s R&D politics because a complementary relationship legitimizes public funding
whereas substitution is regarded as misallocation.
Over time and along with improved scientific methods it became clear that definite statements
regarding the effect of public R&D funding cannot be made. David et al. (2000) surveyed macro- and
microeconomic studies, focusing on their „net impacts“. Only two out of fourteen of these empirical
studies indicated substitutive effects on the aggregate level. On the firm-level the results are less clear,
i.e. nine out of nineteen find substitutional effects. In summary, macroeconomic studies usually
identify a complementary relationship between public and private R&D expenditure, whereas several
micro-studies on the firm-level are not able to confirm this effect. In contrast to macroeconomic
studies, the advantage of a microeconomic analysis is that it can allow for detailed influences among
several determinants that may have an impact on private R&D activities. Recent microeconometric
studies approach the above-mentioned question with firm level or business data provided by
ministerial offices, business publishers, statistical offices or own surveys. Based on this data, the
impact of the available determinants on private R&D activities is tested by panel or cross-sectional
econometric analysis (cf. Klette et al., 2000). 
One major result of the survey by David et al. (2000) is the criticism that previous studies largely
ignored a possible selection bias in the empirical investigations. This issue linked to the public funding
decision had already been described by Lichtenberg (1987) and Klette/Møen (1997). The difficulty of
this aspect lies within potential selection bias of the public institution that – depending on the applying
firm and the relevant R&D project – decides on the public funding process. For instance, governments
usually follow a "picking-the-winner" strategy, that is, firms that are very innovative even in the
absence of public incentive schemes are more likely to receive public grants. The reason is that public
authorities want to maximize social benefits and reduce the risk of failure of R&D projects. Firms that
have been innovative and successful in the past are hence the best candidates for the receipt of
3subsidies, because they are expected to generate the highest social return from the public investment
due to low failure rates and high spill-over effects. “This makes public funding an endogenous
variable, and its inclusion in a linear regression will cause inconsistent estimates if it happens to be
correlated with the error term“ (Busom, 2000: 114). To estimate the “real” effects of public subsidies
it is necessary to address the core evaluation question: "how much would the recipients have invested,
if they had not participated in a public policy scheme?".
In fact, several recent studies on the impact of R&D subsidies attempt to model this counterfactual
situation. Busom (2000) explores this problem by applying an econometric selection model. Based on
Heckman’s selection model2, she estimates a probit model on a participation dummy. In a second
equation, the R&D activity is regressed on several covariates including a selection correction term
which accounts for the different propensities of firms to be publicly funded. The second equation is
estimated separately for participants and non-participants including selection correction terms. The
difference in expected values of R&D expenditure of participants in case of funding and in case of
non-participation is assigned to public funding. Busom concludes that public funding induced more
effort for the majority of firms in her sample, but for 30% of the participants, complete crowding-out
effects cannot be ruled out. Wallsten (2000) uses a simultaneous equations model on the receipt of
public R&D funding from the US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and on the
R&D spending of firms. Applying the 3SLS estimator to a cross-section of funded and non-funded
firms, he finds that the SBIR grants crowd out private investment dollar for dollar. However, he points
out that the program still could have positive effects: the recipient firms might have been able to keep
their innovation activities constant while in the absence of a subsidy they had to reduce them. This
hypothesis would require a longitudinal study, though. Lach (2002) investigates the effects of R&D
subsidies granted by the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade on local manufacturing firms. He
applies different estimators, such as the difference-in-difference estimator and dynamic panel data
models. Although Lach finds heterogeneous results from different models applied, he finally
concludes that subsidies do not crowd out company financed R&D expenditure completely. For small
firms, Lach states that one subsidized New Israeli Schekel (NIS) generates eleven additional NIS of
privately financed R&D. However, as large firms receive most of the funds, one publicly financed NIS
stimulates only 0.23 additional NIS, on average, and this effect is statistically insignificant. Czarnitzki
(2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), as well as Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) employ a matching
approach – as done in this paper - to investigate the impact of public subsidies in Germany, and they
reject full crowding-out in Eastern German manufacturing and in the German service sector;
Hussinger (2003) explores semiparametric selection models using German survey data. She largely
                                                     
2 Heckman’s selection model is extended to the treatment model (see e.g. Maddala, 1983, section 9.2).
4confirms the positive results previously identified with German data. Duguet (2004) employs the
matching methodology with a large panel of French firms covering the years 1985 to 1997.
Controlling for past public support the firms benefited from, he also rejects the crowding out
hypothesis for France. Gonzàlez et al. (2004) investigate subsidies in a panel of more than 2,000
Spanish manufacturing firms and employ a simultaneous equation model. They state that subsidies are
effective in inducing firms to invest into R&D, but they induce only slight changes in the level of
R&D expenditure. They conclude that in the absence of subsidies, publicly supported R&D projects
would be carried out, although in smaller size. However, they do not report crowding-out effects or
inefficient use of subsidies. 
In fact, there exist also a few studies on Belgian data already: Holemans and Sleuwaegen (1988)
where the first who considered the relationship between R&D subsidies and R&D spending for this
country. They consider a small sample of Belgian firms for a period from 1980 to 1984 and estimate a
fixed effects model on the relationship between the log of private R&D expanditure and the log of
public subsidies. Holemans and Sleuwaegen report significant additionality effects of the subsidies.
More recently, Meeusen and Janssens (2001) employ a biannual R&D survey from Flanders covering
the period 1992 to 1997. They perform (dynamic) fixed effects panel estimations to investigate the
impact of subsidies on R&D intensity (R&D/sales) and find that grants from the IWT (the institution
administrating the R&D funds of the Flemish Regional Government) have a strong positive effect on
private R&D spending. However, they do not take into account the possible endogeneity of the
subsidies. Consequently, Suetens (2002) extends the analysis to an IV framework. She also uses the
combination of IWT subsidies data with the biannual survey data and employs a lagged value of
subsidies as an instrument in order to account for endogeneity. While OLS estimations again support
the additionality hypothesis, her results on the IV regressions are not informative. All variables except
a lagged R&D term are insignificant with respect to R&D expenditure. While Suetens states that one
should be very careful in interpreting this result, she actually does not test for the validity of her
instruments. Finally, note that all three studies mentioned are restricted to R&D-performing firms
only.
In summary, the majority of recent studies report complimentary effects of public R&D, but crowding-
out effects, especially partial ones, cannot be ruled out. For Belgium, the first two studies by
Holemans/Sleuwaegen (1988) and Meeusen/Janssens (2001) are in favor of the additionality
hypothesis and the third study by Suetens (2002) is not conclusive. Neither of the previous studies on
Belgium firms explicitely attempt to control for selection bias which is the main issue investigated in
this paper. The following section outlines the matching estimator which is used in the subsequent
empirical analysis.
53 Estimation of Treatment Effects with the Matching Estimator
The modern econometric evaluation techniques have been developed to identify treatment effects
when the available observations on individuals or firms are subject to a selection bias. This typically
occurs when participants in public measures differ from non-participants in important characteristics.
Popular economic studies are on the benefit of active labor market policies.
The literature on the econometrics of evaluation offers different estimation strategies to correct for
selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1997, Heckman et al. 1999 for a survey) including the difference-
in-difference estimator, control function approaches (selection models), IV estimation and non-
parametric matching. The difference-in-difference method requires panel data with observations
before and after/while the treatment (change of subsidy status). As our database (to be described in the
following subsection) consists of a cross-section, we cannot apply this estimator. For the application of
IV estimators and selection models one needs valid instruments for the treatment variables. It is very
difficult in our case to find possible candidates being used as instruments. Hence, the only appropriate
choice is the matching estimator. Its main advantage over IV and selection models is that we neither
have to assume any functional form for the outcome equation nor is a distributional assumption on the
error terms of the selection equation and the outcome equation necessary. The disadvantage is that is
does only control for observed heterogeneity among treated and untreated firms. However, as we
discuss in the next section, we think that our set of covariates allows us to assume that selection on
unobservable effects is unlikely.
Matching estimators have recently been applied and discussed by Angrist (1998), Dehejia and Wahba
(1999), Heckman et al. (1998a, 1998b), and Lechner (1999, 2000). The matching is able to address
directly the question "What would a treated firm with given characteristics have done if it had not been
treated?" A treatment in our context is the receipt of a subsidy for R&D. Those observations on treated
firms are compared with non-treated firms, but not with all non-recipients but a selected group with
similar characteristics. Our fundamental evaluation question can be illustrated by an equation
describing the average treatment effect on the treated individuals or firms, respectively:
( ) ( ) ( )| 1 | 1T CTTE E Y S E Y S= = − =α (1)
where YT is the outcome variable, that is R&D spending in our case. The status S refers to the group:
S=1 is the treatment group and S=0 the non-treated firms. YC is the potential outcome which would
have been realized if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. The problem is obvious: while
the outcome of the treated individuals in case of treatment, E(YT|S=1), is directly observable, it is not
the case for the counterpart. What would these firms have realized if they had not received the
treatment? E(YC|S=1) is a counterfactual situation which is not observable and, therefore, has to be
estimated. In the case of matching, this potential outcome of treated firms is constructed from a control
6group of non-participants. The matching relies on the intuitively attracting idea to balance the sample
of program participants and comparable non-participants. Remaining differences in the outcome
variable between both groups are then attributed to the treatment (Heckman et al., 1997).
Initially the counterfactual cannot simply be estimated as average outcome of the non-participants,
because E(YC|S=1) ≠  E(YC|S=0) due to the possible selection bias. The participant group and non-
participant group are expected to differ, except in cases of randomly assigned measures in
experimental settings. Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to
overcome the selection problem, that is, participation and potential outcome are independent for
individuals with the same set of exogenous characteristics X. If this assumption is valid, it follows that
( ) ( )| 1, | 0,C CE Y S X E Y S X= = = (2)
The outcome of the non-participants can be used to estimate the counterfactual outcome of the
participants in case of non-participation provided that there are no systematic differences between both
groups. The treatment effect can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )| 1,  | 0,T CTTE E Y S X x E Y S X x= = = − = =α (3)
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable differences between
participants and non-participants. In our case, we conduct a Nearest Neighbor matching, that is, for
each treated firm we pick the most similar firm from the potential control group of non-subsidized
firms.3 In addition to the CIA, another important precondition for consistency of the matching
estimator is common support. It is necessary that the control group contains at least one sufficiently
similar observation for each treated firm. In practice, the sample to be evaluated is restricted to
common support. However, if the overlap between the samples is too small the matching estimator is
not applicable.
As one often wants to consider more than one matching argument, one has to deal with the "curse of
dimensionality". If we employ a lot of variables in the matching function, it will become difficult to
find appropriate controls. Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) suggested to use a propensity score as a single
index and thus to reduce the number of variables included in the matching function to just one.
Therefore a probit model is estimated on the dummy indicating the receipt of subsidies S. The
estimated propensity scores are subsequently used as matching argument. Lechner (1998) introduced a
modification of the propensity score matching ("hybrid matching") as one often wants to include
additional variables, e.g. like firm size, directly in the matching function. In this case, instead of a
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7single X (the propensity score), other important characteristics may be employed in the matching
function. The following matching protocol summarizes the empirical implementation of the matching
procedure used in this paper.
Table 1: The matching protocol
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores ( )Pˆ X . 
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities
larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. (This step is
also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as
matching arguments.)
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool.
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the
most similar control observation.
( ) ( )' 1ij j i j iMD Z Z Z Z−= − Ω −
In our case, Z contains the estimated propensity score and the firm size (number of employees) as
additional argument in the matching function. Ω  is the empirical covariance matrix of these
arguments based on the sample of potential controls.
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining sample. (Do not remove the
selected controls from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again.) 
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms.
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can thus be calculated as the
mean difference of the matched samples:
?1ˆ T C
TT i iT
i i
Y Y
n
α = −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
with ?CiY  being the counterfactual for i and nT is the sample size (of treated firms). Note that the same
observation may appear more than once in that group.
Step 8 As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-
statistic on mean differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated
observations into account. Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw
conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors.
4 Data and Estimations
The data used in this paper stem from various sources. The firm level data are the Flemish part of the
third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) and refers to the years from 1998 to 2000. The CIS covers
most EU countries, Norway and Iceland using a largely harmonized questionnaire over countries.
Eurostat (2004) presents detailed descriptive survey results for all countries and aggregate statistics.
Our sample covers the Flemish manufacturing sector and computer services, R&D services as well as
business related services. In total, our sample consists of 776 observations, of them 180 refer to
recipients of R&D subsidies. The CIS data are supplemented with information from the Belfirst
database which contains the annual account data of Belgian firms. Furthermore, the firms are linked to
patent data from the European Patent Office. This source contains all patent applications filed at the
EPO since 1978. 
8The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable indicating firms that received public R&D
funding in the period from 1998 to 2000. The indicator covers subsidies from the local Flemish
Government, the Belgian national Government as well as the EU. As this variable covers a three year
period, we use lagged values of the covariates measured before 1998 whenever possible, in order to
avoid endogeneity problems in the selection equation. As outcome variables, we consider the R&D
expenditure at the firm level in 2000, R&D.4 However, as the distribution of this indicator is very
skewed in the economy, we also investigate the R&D intensity, R&DINT (R&D expenditure / turnover
* 100), and the logs of R&D and R&DINT to check various specifications (see the appendix for the
empirical distribution the variables).5 Due to the skewness of the original variables, some extreme
values might affect the mean of the distribution significantly, so that a few observations may
determine the estimation results. Using the logarithmic transformation scales down the large values
and reduces the problem with these skewed distributions. All R&D indicators mentioned above refer
to the year 2000.
As a further outcome variable, we consider patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) in
the year 2000. In contrast to R&D, patents focus on the outcome of the innovation process and thus on
successful R&D projects. However, the number of observations with patent applications at the EPO in
our sample is very low: only 43 firms filed EPO patents from 1998 to 2000. Once again, due to the
skewness of the distribution we consider the number of patent applications per employee
(PATENT/EMP) and a dummy variable indicating patenting firms (D(PATENT>0)).
We use several control variables in our analysis that might affect both the probability to receive
subsidies and R&D or innovation expenditure, respectively: the inclusion of the number of employees
at the beginning of the period controls for size effects (EMP1998). Another important variable in our
analysis is the firms' patent stock. Where our main data source is only a cross-section of the CIS and
no time-series information is included, the patent stock enables us to control for previous (successful)
R&D activities. We use all patent information in the EPO database and generate the stock of patents
per firm as the depreciated sum of all patents filed at the EPO from 1979 until 1997: 
( ) , 11it i t itPS PS PAδ −= − + ,
where PS is the patent stock of firm i in period t, PA are the number of patent applications filed at the
EPO and δ  is a constant depreciation rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15, as common in the
literature (see e.g. Hall, 1990). On the one hand, firms that exhibit previous successful innovation
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5 In case of the logarithmic specification, we replace zero values of R&D and R&DINT with the minimum
observed value in order to generate the log of the variables.
9projects indicated by patents, are more likely to receive public R&D funding, because the public
authorities follow the "picking-the-winner" principle in order to minimize the expected failure rates of
the innovation projects, and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the society. On the other
hand, the patent stock controls for the past average innovation engagement of the firms, because it is
expected that firms that were highly innovative in the past will continue this strategy. Although our
data is basically cross-sectional, the patent stock allows us to control for the time-series dimension of
the innovation activities.6 The patents are counted only until 1997, to ensure that the stock definitely
refers to past innovation activities, in order to avoid a simultaneous equation bias in the regression
analysis. The patent stock enters into the regression as patent stock per employee (PS/EMP) to reduce
multicollinearity with firm size.
Furthermore, the export quota from 1998 (EXQU1998 = exports / turnover) measures the degree of
international competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be more innovative
than others and, hence, are more likely to apply for subsidies. Another indicator considered is the
capital intensity. This variable is taken from the BELFIRST database and refers to the year 1997
(KAPINT1997 = fixed assets / EMP). Companies with a capital-intensive production process supposedly
rely more on innovation activities than more labor-intensive firms. In addition, we include two
financial measures that could influence both the public funding probability and the outcome variables.
According to the standard financing hierarchy, firms tend to finance risky undertakings like R&D with
internal resources. If these are exhausted they turn to external resources which are subject to
increasing marginal cost of capital due to the increasing default risk (cf. Fazzari et al., 2000, or
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Moreover, a highly leveraged company may not be able to raise
additional external capital for risky R&D projects which would result in financial constraints and less
R&D activities. We take these hypotheses into account by using the cash flow per employee
(CF1997/EMP1997) which approximates the internal resources for R&D (see, for example, Harhoff,
1998). In order to take financial constraints due to external resources into account, we include the debt
in relation to total assets (DEBT1997 = debt / total assets). Both financial measures have been extracted
from the Belfirst database.
Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a group controls for different
governance structures (GROUP). Firms that belong to a group may be more likely to receive subsidies
because they presumably have better access to information about governmental actions due to their
network linkages. In contrast, if firms belong to a group with a foreign parent company (FOREIGN), it
                                                     
6 Of course, not all innovation efforts lead to patents, and the propensity to patent may be heterogeneous among
firms, but as there are no data on previous R&D expenditure available, the patent stock is the best available
approximation of past innovation activities.
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may be the case that the group tends to file applications in its home country or that, due to the foreign
ownership, a Flemish subsidiary does not qualify for local or national technology programs.
4.1 Full sample
This subsection presents the empirics using the full sample, i.e. the potential control group also
contains innovators. As Czarnitzki (2002) shows, a subsidy may not only affect the amount of R&D
expenditure, but also the R&D status of firms. The smaller a firm is or less collaterals it can offer, the
less it will be able to raise external capital for risky projects, which results in cash-constraints and
finally in the termination of any innovation activity. A subsidy could alleviate those constraints
significantly as the receipt of subsidies may serve as a certification of the firms' activities, and may
hence enable it to convince possible financiers. Lerner (1999) pointed that out in the case of subsidies
from the US SBIR program. Therefore, we first consider the full sample allowing for non-innovating
firms in the potential control group that could be selected as matching partner. This procedure takes
into account firms’ R&D status. If one would only consider innovating companies, one might
underestimate the treatment effects, because the model does not allow firms to drop out of any
innovation activity in case they did not receive public R&D funding. However, we consider this
scenario as a further robustness check in the following subsection. Table 2 shows the descriptive
statistics of the variables in the full sample. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (full sample, N = 776)a)
subsidized firms potential control group
N1 = 180 N0 = 596
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value of two-
sided t-test on
mean equality
lnEMP 4.415 1.439 3.785 1.248 p < 0.0001
PSTOCK/EMP 0.717 2.405 0.127 0.936 p = 0.0015
GROUP 0.683 0.466 0.540 0.499 p = 0.0004
FOREIGN 0.300 0.460 0.257 0.437 p = 0.2637
EXPORT 0.530 0.333 0.354 0.341 p < 0.0001
KAPINT 0.039 0.056 0.052 0.308 p = 0.3571
DEBT 0.660 0.205 0.673 0.398 p = 0.5700
CF/EMP 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.036 p = 0.1488
( )Pˆ X 0.321 0.172 0.204 0.123 p < 0.0001
R&D 1.968 6.510 0.390 2.526 p = 0.0017
R&DINT 4.664 8.427 1.727 5.114 p < 0.0000
D(PATENT>0) 0.072 0.260 0.017 0.129 p = 0.0062
PATENT/EMP 0.092 0.506 0.015 0.139 p = 0.0455
a) 12 industry dummies not reported. 
As the t-tests show there are some significant differences among the group of subsidized firms and the
potential control group. Subsidized firms are larger, have a higher patent stock, achieve a higher
export quota and are more likely to belong to a group. More important, the recipients of public R&D
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funding show higher R&D expenditure, on average. There is also a significant difference in patenting
activity. However, it is questionable whether these differences can be assigned to the treatment, at
least partially, or whether they are determined by the other differing firm characteristics among the
two groups. 
In order to investigate this, we apply the matching methodology as outlined in the previous section.
First, a probit model on the receipt of subsidies is estimated (see Table 3). As already indicated in the
descriptive statistics, the most important variables driving the selection are firm size, the patent stock
and the export activity. The estimates additionally show that a firm with a foreign parent company is
less likely to receive subsidies than other firms. On the one hand, it may be the parent companies
which mainly file applications for public R&D funding in their home country. On the other hand,
foreignly owned companies may not be eligible for a number of Flemish technology policies. Based
on the estimated propensity scores (see the significant difference in average scores in Table 2) and
firm size, a nearest neighbor is selected out of the potential control group for each treated firm. The
marginal effects on subsidies are calculated at the sample means and their standard errors are obtained
by the delta method. As shown in Table 3, the conclusions on statistical inference are the same for the
estimated coefficients and their marginal effects.
Table 3: Probit estimation on the receipt of subsidies
Probit estimates Marginal effects
Coef. Std. err. dy/dx Std. err
lnEMP 0.184 *** 0.047 0.053 *** 0.013
PSTOCK/EMP 0.106 *** 0.038 0.031 *** 0.011
GROUP 0.181 0.133 0.052 0.037
FOREIGN -0.337 ** 0.142 -0.091 *** 0.035
EXPORT 0.725 *** 0.171 0.209 *** 0.049
KAPINT -0.108 0.280 -0.031 0.081
DEBT -0.117 0.206 -0.034 0.060
CF/EMP 1.156 1.501 0.333 0.433
Constant term -1.926 *** 0.319
Test on joint significance
on industry dummies c
2(11) = 16.49
Log-Likelihood -378.1717
Pseudo R-squared 0.1002
Number of obs. 776
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The regression includes 11 industry dummies.
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Figure 1 shows Kernel density estimations of the matching arguments, the propensity scores and firm
size, before and after the matching. Although the distributions are quite different before the matching,
there is a sufficient overlap of the distributions between both groups to apply the matching
methodology. The samples are restricted to common support in order to estimate the treatment effect
on the treated. As a result, only five observations on subsidized firms are lost which does not
noticeably affects the sample. As the graphs on the distributions of the propensity scores and firm size
after the matching already demonstrate, both groups are well balanced with respect to the matching
arguments after performing the estimation. 
Table 4 presents the results of the matching by the propensity score and firm size in more detail. As
the means and corresponding t-tests show, both samples are well balanced according to all employed
covariates after the matching. There are no statistically significant differences in the exogenous
variables, and especially in the propensity score at the 5% level. However, there are still mean
differences in both R&D and R&DINT, and these can be assigned to the treatment. Hence, a crowding-
out effect can be rejected with regard to the public R&D funding. On average, the subsidized firms
would have significantly invested less in R&D if they had not been subsidized. For instance, with
respect to the R&D intensity, the average treatment effect on the treated amounts to
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ˆ 4.621-1.746 2.875TTα = =  and is statistically significant below the 5% level. Table 8 in the
appendix displays OLS regressions of the different R&D variables on the covariates and the subsidy
dummy. It turns out that the OLS estimates are quite similar to the matching in our case. This points to
the conclusion that the selection bias is not too serious in our application for Flanders. 
Table 4: Matching results (based on full sample, N = 776)a)
subsidized firms potential control group
N1 = 175 N0 = 175
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value of two-
sided t-test on
mean equalityb)
lnEMP 4.355 1.386 4.309 1.381 p = 0.783
PSTOCK/EMP 0.512 1.664 0.471 1.761 p = 0.844
GROUP 0.680 0.468 0.623 0.486 p = 0.331
FOREIGN 0.291 0.456 0.297 0.458 p = 0919
EXPORT 0.522 0.332 0.528 0.365 p = 0.899
KAPINT 0.040 0.057 0.034 0.059 p = 0.466
DEBT 0.664 0.204 0.615 0.224 p = 0.066
CF/EMP 0.017 0.020 0.025 0.085 p = 0.385
( )Pˆ X 0.304 0.148 0.299 0.138 p = 0.763
R&D 1.700 6.267 0.589 1.520 p = 0.025
lnR&D -2.113 3.096 -4.552 4.196 p < 0.001
R&DINT 4.621 8.473 1.746 3.627 p < 0.001
lnR&DINT -0.108 2.454 -2.104 3.020 p < 0.001
D(PATENT>0) 0.109 0.312 0.091 0.289 p = 0.639
PATENT/EMP 0.224 0.942 0.179 0.712 p = 0.647
a) 12 industry dummies not reported.
b) t-statistics are based on Lechner's (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for
sampling with replacement in the selected control group.
However, as Table 4 also shows there are no significant differences in patenting behavior after the
matching. The main reason for this result is possibly the small sample of firms filing EPO patents from
1998 to 2000. The matched samples contain only 35 EPO-patenting firms in total. For an appropriate
analysis of the output side of the innovation process it would perhaps be more useful to investigate
sales with new products or cost reductions due to process innovations. In this case, however, a
longitudinal database would be desirable, as the market result or cost reduction is expected to occur
with a considerable time-lag after completion of the corresponding R&D projects. As we currently use
only the cross-section of the CIS3 database, a longitudinal analysis is obviously beyond the scope of
this paper.
4.2 Subsample of innovating firms
In the full sample, crowding-out effects for R&D can be rejected. As a further test, we consider only
the subsample of innovating firms in this subsection. In our opinion, this underestimates the treatment
effects, because some firms, especially smaller firms, may be completely deterred from doing R&D if
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they do not receive a subsidy. On the one hand, the risk of failure, and thus the expected cost, might be
too high for small firms if there is no public support. On the other hand, small firms might just not be
able to raise external capital for conducting R&D in the absence of public R&D funding. However,
some readers may argue that the previous results are simply due to several non-innovators in the
selected control group. For this reason, we now focus on innovating firms.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (subsample of innovating firms, N = 570)a)
subsidized firms potential control group
N1 = 180 N0 = 390
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value of two-
sided t-test on
mean equality
lnEMP 4.415 1.439 4.038 1.321 p = 0.0031
PSTOCK/EMP 0.717 2.405 0.159 1.033 p = 0.0032
GROUP 0.683 0.466 0.608 0.489 p = 0.0772
FOREIGN 0.300 0.460 0.308 0.462 p = 0.8530
EXPORT 0.530 0.333 0.400 0.349 p < 0.0001
KAPINT 0.039 0.056 0.046 0.194 p = 0.5581
DEBT 0.660 0.205 0.679 0.459 p = 0.5022
CF/EMP 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.042 p = 0.5513
( )Pˆ X 0.384 0.179 0.284 0.121 p < 0.0001
R&D 1.968 6.510 0.596 3.104 p = 0.0077
R&DINT 4.664 8.427 2.638 6.132 p = 0.0041
D(PATENT>0) 0.072 0.260 0.023 0.150 p = 0.0189
PATENT/EMP 0.092 0.506 0.022 0.171 p = 0.0727
a) 12 industry dummies not reported. 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics of both groups. Like in the foregoing analysis using the full
sample, we find similar differences in both exogenous and endogenous variables. Even the subsequent
probit estimation is very similar to the full sample. The size, the patent stock, international competition
and the governance structure determine the differences between publicly funded and non-funded
Flemish companies (see Table 6). 
Again, the matched samples are well balanced with respect to the propensity score and the covariates
after the matching procedure. In contrast to the full sample results, the estimated treatment effects are
– as expected – somewhat smaller in this case. In the case of R&D activities, we can still reject
crowding-out effects in most cases. Except in levels of R&D where the t-test is not significant, the
mean equality can be rejected for the logarithmic R&D variables and the R&D intensity. Similar to the
case using the full sample, the average R&D intensity amounts to 4,7% in the sample of subsidized
firms. In the absence of subsidies these firms would have exhibited a significantly smaller R&D
intensity: 2,2% on average. For comparison, we also include OLS estimates in the appendix (see Table
9). It turns out that they are again quite similar to the matching results which points to the conclusion
that the selection bias is not too serious in our sample.
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Table 6: Probit estimation on the receipt of subsidies (innovating firms only)
Probit estimates Marginal effects at sample means
Coef. Std. err. dy/dx Std. err
lnEMP 0.108 *** 0.051 0.038 *** 0.018
PSTOCK/EMP 0.105 *** 0.040 0.037 *** 0.014
GROUP 0.135 0.146 0.047 0.050
FOREIGN -0.346 ** 0.150 -0.116 ** 0.048
EXPORT 0.592 *** 0.184 0.208 *** 0.064
KAPINT -0.072 0.433 -0.025 0.152
DEBT -0.079 0.188 -0.028 0.066
CF/EMP 0.588 1.574 0.206 0.552
Constant term -1.230 *** 0.345
Test on joint significance
on industry dummies c
2(11) = 13.46
Log-Likelihood -331.027
Pseudo R-squared 0.0688
Number of obs. 570
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The regression includes 11 industry dummies.
Table 7: Matching results (based on subsample of innovating firms, N = 570)a)
subsidized firms potential control group
N1 = 173 N0 = 173
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p-value of two-
sided t-test on
mean equality b)
lnEMP 4.342 1.381 4.398 1.380 p = 0.745
PSTOCK/EMP 0.503 1.665 0.464 2.297 p = 0.879
GROUP 0.676 0.469 0.618 0.487 p = 0.331
FOREIGN 0.289 0.455 0.277 0.449 p = 0.836
EXPORT 0.528 0.329 0.550 0.359 p = 0.618
KAPINT 0.035 0.039 0.028 0.027 p = 0.074
DEBT 0.664 0.204 0.669 0.229 p = 0.852
CF/EMP 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.014 p = 0.619
( )Pˆ X 0.364 0.136 0.365 0.144 p = 0.957
R&D 1.718 6.301 1.075 4.591 p = 0.327
lnR&D -2.075 3.062 -3.430 3.862 p = 0.050
R&DINT 4.673 8.508 2.204 3.728 p = 0.001
lnR&DINT -0.071 2.432 -1.183 2.779 p = 0.001
D(PATENT>0) 0.110 0.314 0.098 0.299 p = 0.759
PATENT/EMP 0.227 0.947 0.191 0.841 p = 0.742
a) 12 industry dummies not reported.
b) t-statistics are based on Lechner's (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for
sampling with replacement in the selected control group.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate potential crowding-out effects of public R&D policies in Flanders
empirically. Using the Flemish sample of the third Community Innovation Survey from 2001, we
conduct a treatment effects analysis to address the question whether public R&D funding stimulates
private innovation activities or whether firms just substitute public means for private investment. The
treatment effects analysis amounts to an estimation of the counterfactual situation: "How much
innovative activity had the recipients of public R&D funding shown if they were not subsidized?" We
use a non-parametric matching estimator to estimate the counterfactual situation. 
It turns out that firms which received public funding for innovation projects would have invested
significantly less in R&D if they would not have received the subsidies. This holds true for both the
full sample and a subsample of innovating firms only. First, we use the full sample that also includes
non-innovative firms in the control group, because there may be subsidized firms that would not have
conducted any R&D if they had not been subsidized. The reasons can range from too costly or too
risky research projects to the inability to raise sufficient external capital. If the potential control group
is restricted to innovating firms only, one thus might underestimate the treatment effect, because the
innovation status of a firm can change from non-innovative to innovative due to the receipt of a
subsidy and vice versa. In addition to the full sample, however, we also test the hypothesis of
crowding out effects in the subsample of innovating firms only, because some readers might argue that
the first result is driven by the non-innovative firms only. However, the results confirm the previous
estimations. The hypothesis of crowding-out is also rejected in the subsample of innovating firms. 
Further research in this field calls for an analysis that accounts for the time-series dimension of the
innovation and subsidy process more in detail than has been possible in this study. It would be useful
to check the robustness of our results, controling for previous R&D activities, e.g. in a difference-in-
difference setting. Our analysis uses only a binary choice variable on the receipt of a subsidy. It would
be desirable to take the amount of subsidies into account in further studies. Moreover, R&D spending
only considers the input side of the innovation process. Although crowding-out effects can be rejected,
we cannot assume that this increased R&D spending results in new products and processes and thus in
increased welfare in society. On the one hand, it may be possible that mainly wages of R&D personnel
increased, but that their productivity remained constant. On the other hand, the subsidized projects
might be associated with higher failure risk than other innovation projects. Hence, the increased R&D
spending could possibly not lead to more innovation in the economy, if many subsidized projects fail.
Again, such desirable studies on innovation outcome require long time-series data to allow for a
reasonable lag structure between the date of market introduction of new products or the
implementation of new processes and the time period when the corresponding R&D projects were
actually performed.
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Appendix
Figure 2: Distributions of different R&D variables
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Table 8: OLS estimates on different R&D variables (full sample)a
Dependent variable:
R&D R&DINT lnR&D lnR&DINT
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Std. err. Std. err. Std. err. Std. err.
lnEMP 1.05 ** -0.20 1.18 *** 0.38 ***
0.26 0.16 0.12 0.09
PSTOCK/EMP 0.37 ** 0.50 ** 0.25 *** 0.19 ***
0.15 0.21 0.06 0.05
GROUP -0.52 *** 0.17 0.45 0.34
0.25 0.51 0.30 0.26
FOREIGN 0.45 -1.49 *** -0.45 -0.49 *
0.41 0.50 0.34 0.27
EXPORT -0.53 2.13 *** 1.74 *** 1.24 ***
0.73 0.78 0.43 0.34
CF/EMP 8.79 3.60 3.66 2.16
6.60 3.38 2.30 2.72
DEBT 0.05 -0.38 0.29 0.23
0.19 0.48 0.21 0.19
KAPINT 0.40 * 0.62 0.25 0.14
0.22 0.77 0.58 0.46
SUBSIDY DUMMY 0.76 2.41 *** 2.50 *** 2.01 ***
0.49 0.54 0.27 0.23
Constant term -4.32 0.45 -11.79 -5.65
1.17 0.81 0.65 0.52
Test on joint significance on
industry dummies [F(11,755)] 1.87 ** 7.07 *** 4.32 *** 5.59 ***
Number of obs. 776 776 776 776
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.38 0.24
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The regression includes 11 industry dummies.
a) We also run Tobit regressions with this sample as the distribution of R&D is left censored in this case.
However, the estimations lead basically to the same interpretion and therefore we ommit a detailed presentation.
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Table 9: OLS estimates on different R&D variables (innovating firms only)
Dependent variable:
R&D R&DINT lnR&D lnR&DINT
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Std. err. Std. err. Std. err. Std. err.
lnEMP 1.30 *** -0.33 1.01 *** 0.13
0.32 0.20 0.12 0.10
PSTOCK/EMP 0.38 ** 0.51 ** 0.26 *** 0.19 ***
0.16 0.21 0.04 0.04
GROUP -0.63 ** -0.25 0.37 0.16
0.30 0.71 0.33 0.29
FOREIGN 0.34 -1.56 *** -0.65 * -0.56 *
0.45 0.58 0.33 0.27
EXPORT -0.69 2.27 ** 1.44 *** 0.89 **
0.96 0.99 0.46 0.37
CF/EMP 9.79 2.58 1.73 0.33
7.36 3.60 2.09 2.86
DEBT 0.09 -0.55 0.26 0.19
0.22 0.54 0.20 0.17
KAPINT 1.12 * 1.83 1.21 * 0.80
0.59 1.78 0.65 0.56
SUBSIDY DUMMY 0.75 1.74 *** 1.11 *** 0.87 ***
0.53 0.57 0.27 0.23
Constant term -5.75 1.82 -8.92 -2.86
1.56 1.12 0.72 0.60
Test on joint significance on
industry dummies [F(11,549)] 1.93 ** 7.20 *** 3.42 *** 4.57 ***
Number of obs. 570 570 570 570
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.30 0.15
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The regression includes 11 industry dummies.
